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The  paper examines several outstanding issues on the interface between the measurement of
performance  in primary and secondary education and the management of improved performance
in this nationally important sector. These issues relate to the clarification of the objectives of the
education  system, the impact of performance reward systems, such as Performance Related Pay,
the role of resources in influencing educational outcomes, the reliability of existing methods of
assessing  educational performance, such as Data Envelopment Analysis and multivariate
regression,  and the need for an improved national comparative database if progress is to be made
in several of  these directions.
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Introduction
Education  provides an important  area of application for systems of performance management and
for  techniques of performance measurement.  Education is currently an area with a high national
p riority, in the form of a high weight given by  politicians on the raising of educational standards
and  performance, particularly in  primary and secondary education. However, the careful
de velopment of performance management systems and performance measurement techniques
poses  a  number of detailed analytical problems that take on particular significance  in the
education sector, and which  merit further examination. At the same time, interesting issues are
rai sed about how best to increase and manage knowledge and information in the process of raising
educational performance.
Clarification of objectives
A key  potential role for non-profit performance indicators  in public services, such as  education,
is  that of clarification of  the objectives of each service
1.  The  need for such clarification becomes
even more relevant if  performance measures  are deployed within performance reward systems,
such  as Performance Related Pay (PRP), or within performance management systems that make
public  judgements on individual schools and teachers, such as in publicly available OFSTED
2
school inspection reports in the UK. These systems can provide powerful incentives for individual
schools  and teachers to seek to maximise their reported performance according to the
measurement  framework that is imposed upon them by the performance reward or management
system.  However, there are a number of systematic ways in which this may lead to ‘sub-
optimisation’ of the educational outcomes compared to wider social goals.
The  first is a neglect  within the reported performance measures of one or more of the dimensions
of  educational outcomes that are actually valued by society at large. These dimensions might
include some measure of the extent of pupils’ fulfilment or satisfaction that pupils themselves
derive  from the large proportion of their lives they spend in education. There may then exist a
non-monotonic underlying relationship  between pupils’  satisfaction and reported examination 2
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results,  as in Figure 1. Over some range, such as from A to B in Figure 1,  pupils’ satisfaction may
increase   when they are the subject of more education aimed at improving their examination
results.  However,  after some point the additional stress and pressures that they suffer from
further  increasing their examination performance reduces their satisfaction and sense of fulfilment
from the educational process itself, as between points B and D in Figure 1. Even greater pressure
may  impair also their examination performance, as between points D and E.  An overall evaluation
function F( ÷ ,  ø ) that pays attention both to the level of  their examination results,  ÷ ,  and  to the
level  of pupil satisfaction,  ø ,  may achieve its maximum point subject to the underlying relationship
between   ÷  and  ø   at a point such as C in Figure 1. Maximising examination results at point D will
lead  to a lower overall value of F than at C, by trading-off in a sub-optimal way (according to the
evaluation  function F) reduced pupil satisfaction for higher examination results. In contrast, a
performanc e management system that places value only on examination results and deploys a
frontier technique, such as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
3, 4 , will identify a school at point
C as inefficient compared to a school at point D within the subspace defined by all feasible values
of  examination results,  ÷ .  A wider issue raised for performance management systems is then how3
far  improved reported performance is genuinely the result of increased organisational efficiency
inside  the feasible frontier of achievement,  and how far it is instead due to moving along a frontier
in a larger dimensional space that involves sacrificing less easily measurable outcomes, such as
pupil  satisfaction, self-fulfilment or enjoyment, which may still nevertheless be valued by some
important  stakeholders in the production process. Whilst this issue arises even when there is a
monotonic  negative relationship between the two outputs, a change in the direction of the
relationship can undermine any initial assumption that there is no conflict between the two outputs
that is made when they are initially positive related under conditions of low stress.
The  relative evaluation of  pupil satisfaction or fulfilment compared to examination results also
raises complex issues concerning the relative importance, and size, of the short-term and long-
term  benefits that are derived from the educational process. Whilst this in part involves questions
of the discount rate that should be applied in present value calculations for these future benefits
compared  to current benefits, underlying issues are also involved concerning the extent of the
future benefits which will be obtained by different groups of pupils from improved examination
results.  The relative valuation of  improved examination results and future national achievements
in  sport may also arise if increased pressures on pupils and teachers to boost examination results
diminishes the time devoted to active participation in sporting activities.  
Achieving  an overall optimal level of performance for the education system within finite total
resources  for the educational system is itself likely to involve  trade-offs between the resources
devoted  to different groups of pupils, and the resultant benefits which these different groups
obtain  from the additional educational resourcing. Many existing statements of objectives for the
educational system are formulated in  terms which recognise no such trade-offs. Thus the UK’s
Department  for Education and Employment (DfEE)
5 states its aim as to be “to give everyone the
chance,  through education, training and work, to realise their full potential, and thus build an
inclusive  and fair society and a competitive economy”.  Under certain conditions, frontier
performance  measurement techniques, such as DEA, can be used to assist in the process of
making all groups within the educational  system better off,  by identifying the scope for  Pareto
improvements, i.e. movements to  feasible vectors of educational outcomes for each relevant pupil
group  on the DEA efficiency frontier that  dominate the existing organisational achievements for4
each of  these pupil groups. They can also help to identify the nature of the trade-offs which are
involved  on the production side of the educational process along this efficiency frontier between
the  educational outcomes for these different groups. In doing so, they can help to make policy
judgements  on how to allocate resources between these different groups more explicit and better
informed.  However, the identification of both the extent of the possible Pareto improvements and
the shape of  the efficiency frontier is contingent upon the available  information being organised
in  a suitable  disaggregated form  that enables  the achievements of different pupil groups
themselves to be identified.
Without such disaggregation, reliance  upon current standard measures of school achievements,
such as the proportion of pupils achieving five or more GCSE grades A* - C, is likely to involve
a  number of more questionable  implicit policy trade-offs between the achievements of different
pupil  groups. Linking these standard performance measures to performance reward systems, such
as  PRP, is in turn likely to cause these implicit, and possibly ill-considered, trade-offs to drive
educational  outcomes. Providing an incentive for a school or teacher to maximise  the proportion
of  pupils achieving five or more GCSE grades A* - C itself encourages the development of an
internal  performance management system aimed at ‘managing the margins’
6 of pupils who are on
the  borderline of  achieving just five GCSE grades A* - C.  Directing additional resources and
attention  to them, and away from those who are unlikely to be raised to this level and away from
those  who are well above this borderline of achievement, is the performance management strategy
most geared to the goal at hand, albeit at a cost to wider educational objectives. That this ill-
designed  performance indicator, which is prominent also in the targets set for the education
system as a whole
7,  8 ,  is increasingly dominating many educational policies within schools is
confirmed by a recent study by Gillborn and Youdell
9. 
Avoiding  such implicit and questionable trade-offs, however, requires more explicit attention to
be given to sensitive issues concerning the attitude which the educational system should take to
inequality of educational achievements. Once recognition is given to overall educational resource
constraints,  the question arises as to whether the educational system should devote at the margin
more resources to those  at the lower end of the educational spectrum of examination results, or
to those in the centre, or to the pursuit of excellence by those at the upper end of the spectrum.5
Educationa l performance management systems that operate under the assumption that there are
still  large Pareto improvements to be had within the educational system can to some extent avoid
this  question. However, the greater the success that is achieved by the performance management
system  in realising these Pareto improvements, the greater is the need to recognise the policy
issues that arise once schools are on the  efficiency frontier and optimal resourcing choices have
to be made along this frontier of educational achievement.    
There  are, fortunately, economic reasons for believing that any strongly unequal system of
edu cational resource allocation is itself likely in the long term to be  Pareto inefficient for all pupil
groups,  once account is taken of the long-term  pecuniary externalities that  may exist between the
di fferent groups. Neglecting educational resources and achievement at the lower end of the
spectrum  is likely to lead to large numbers of  poorly educated, unqualified and disaffected
individuals who are in a weak position in the labour market, and who may  impose high long-term
costs  on the rest of the economy through increased social security payments, increased crime
rates
10  and other social problems.  Neglecting educational resources and achievement at  the upper
end  of the spectrum is likely to undermine  overall national economic competitiveness and the tax
base from whom other members of the community can benefit. Even a ‘maxi-min’ policy of
‘maximising  the welfare of the worst-off individual’
11 ,  involving an extreme aversion to inequality ,
can  imply relatively low optimal marginal income tax rates on the highest income earners
12  in
order  not to deter them from earning more and contributing more tax revenue to finance greater
benefits for the  worst-off individual. Similar arguments are likely to limit the extent to which it
is in the interest of all current pupil groups to under-resource high educational achievers.   
A further source of implicit educational weights is that of the equal weighting in reported School
Performance  Tables
13  of examination results in different subjects, such as business studies,
economics,  physics and mathematics. Such equal weighting in itself implies an  indifference in the
valuation  of educational outcomes under  performance reward systems that respond  to aggregate
point  scores irrespective of the subject involved, either for the school or for individual pupils
seeking  admission to higher education on the basis of their A-level grades. However, such equal
weighting  is itself likely to encourage a switching of pupils out of subjects which are relatively
more  demanding in their technical level and of greater perceived difficulty for achieving target6
grade  levels, despite the possibly adverse impact this switch may have upon many traditional areas
of  UK excellence. Thus an important feature of educational change in recent years has been
substantial  relative reductions in the numbers of pupils taking  A-level economics (which has
dr opped from 6.6% of A-level entries in 1990 to 2.6% in 1999
14 ),  physics (which has dropped
from  6.6% of A-level entries in 1990 to 4.6% in 1999) ,  and mathematics  (which has dropped
from  11.6% in 1990 to 8.7% in 1999), together with increases in pupil numbers  taking A-levels
in  less technical and less mathematical subjects, such as business studies (which has risen from
1.8%  in 1990 to 4.6% in 1999
14 ) . Similarly at GCSE,  the school league table goal of maximising
GCSE  grades A* - C may be more easily achieved in mathematics itself  by entering students for
the  less technically demanding  ‘restricted-grade’  GCSE examination. Whilst a grade B is the
maximum possible mark  in this examination, a  grade C is usually judged as easier to attain for
marginal  students than in the unrestricted-grade GCSE examination that has a higher technical
content. 
Placing more explicit differential weights in  performance evaluation upon different subjects and
upon  different pupil groups, however, raises issues of  the scope for linking performance
management  systems to systems-wide  strategic management considerations of where the
educational  system as a whole should be headed, particularly in its interface with the future labour
market  needs of different possible areas of economic specialisation for the economy as a whole.
Prominent  authors
15,16  on strategies for boosting competitive advantage emphasise the importance
of  clusters of  specialised inputs,  such as a ready availability of well-qualified students from
specialised  educational institutions able to recruit well-qualified staff, for reinforcing and
maintaining  the competitive advantage of firms and the economy as a whole in particular
specialised  directions. International competition is likely to reward those countries which are well-
organised  in identifying and boosting the directions in which they can command an international
competitive  advantage, and penalise those countries which are not well-organised. If this
competitive  advantage involves a high level of technical expertise which requires strong
mathematical proficiency and greater linkages between the educational system and vocational and
professional  training
17 ,  then long-run issues of the relative priorities of the educational system are
indeed raised which must help to drive its performance management system.  7
However, specialisation may also bring with it additional risks, such as increased exposure to
relative price changes and exchange rate movements that may reduce the future economic value
of  particular educational specialisms. Despite several discernible systematic changes in
employment patterns in recent years, such as a  reduction in middle management opportunities
through  ‘delayering’ in traditional  industries such as banking, and an increased globalisation of
economic  markets, considerable uncertainty and volatility remain important features of the world
economy.   Such uncertainty undermines any attempt at linking the strategic management of
educat ional objectives to a mechanistic view of  manpower planning based upon a definitive
prediction  of future labour market needs. Educational objectives instead need to balance the
dev elopment of  broadly-based aptitudes, including numeracy, literacy and computer skills,  that
have  generic applicability to a wide range of labour markets and can reinforce  labour market
flexibility and adaptability,  with more specialised teaching that can support the subsequent
development  of economically valuable specialist skills. An examination system that adequately
tests both generic and specialised skill and knowledge acquisition is then a critical input into the
educational performance management system. Rather than  relying upon aggregate examination
results  regardless of subject, there is a need to monitor performance in each relevant direction,
and  arguably to restrict the weights which are used in an evaluation technique such as DEA to
non-trivial values on critical skills
18 .  
Pursuit of the objective of maximisation of aggregate examination results is, however, encouraged
the performance reward system that is implicit in the funding mechanism for individual schools
in England and Wales.  This  requires at least 80 per cent of the school’s income from its Local
Education  Authority (LEA) to be based upon the school’s  (age-weighted) pupil numbers
19 .
Schools  that are more successful in this objective will tend to encourage more parents who have
access  to School Performance Tables to enrol their pupils, and thereby boost the school’s  income
under this funding system. If  there are  increasing returns to scale and scope in the production
of  school examination success, the boost in the school’s total resources will enable it to invest in
more specialised staff and facilities, as well as to attract higher quality staff, and to offer a broader
range  of specialised teaching, further boosting its educational performance. In contrast, those
schools  with low levels of examination performance will suffer falling income and pupil numbers,
high  average costs per pupil (once fixed costs and loss of scale economies are taken into account),8
and  a reduction in the quantity and  quality of specialised staff they can attract or retain under the
resultant  school budgetary pressures, making their task of  performance improvement more
difficult .  As a performance management system, it  therefore has a potentially destabilising
positive feedback loop that tends to be dysfunctional for the performance of individual schools
that  fall behind in the above objective, and instead diverts resources to those schools that are
initially ahead in this objective. The use of unadjusted  aggregate examination results within the
performance  reward system also tends to reward schools that are more selective in their pupil
intake  and examination entries in favour of more able pupils, to the likely detriment of the
educational chances of less able pupils. Again, the importance of making a well-considered choice
of objective and associated performance measure is underlined.
The  use of more sophisticated methods of performance assessment, such as DEA, can fortunately
potentially overcome many of the defects of existing league table performance measures. DEA
permits  the use of characteristics of the pupil intake as input variables that can be used within the
overall  assessment of each individual school and LEA’s performance 
3,20 .  These characteristics can
include socio-economic variables that are believed to be related to the extent of  educational
disadvantage the pupil’s background and circumstances involve.  A school with high examination
results  but an advantaged pupil intake will then not necessarily be judged educationally more
effective by  DEA than a  school with the weaker examination results and a disadvantaged pupil
intake.   The use of pupil  post codes linked to Census Enumeration Districts  can in principle
facilitate  such an analysis using disaggregated pupil-level scores and input data, as well as for
more  aggregated school and LEA level data. An alternative approach here is the use of individual
pupil  prior attainment scores in earlier school tests to characterise the characteristics of the pupil
intake.  Such scores have been extensively used in  value added assessments
21  of school
performance  that rely not on the multi-dimensional framework of DEA, but instead on a
compariso n of the actual examination scores of individual pupils with what they would predicted
to  have achieved given their prior attainment scores on the basis of a national sample.  Multi-level
models
22  seek to examine the quantitative magnitude of the LEA, school and pupil-level influences
on the extent of individual pupils’ educational value added.9
The role of resources in education
A central question in educational performance assessment and performance management is the
role  of resources in influencing educational outcomes. The present UK Government has invested
a  claimed additional £19 billion
5 in education in the expectation of improved educational outcomes
from  the UK education system. The DfEE has entered into Public Service Agreement
7 with HM
Treasury  with promises of delivering quantitative targets of improved educational performance,
including an increase  in the proportion of those aged 16 who achieve 5 or more GCSEs grades
A*  - C from 45 per cent to 50 per cent, in return for this additional funding. The target of a
further  four percentage points increase in this performance indicator forms part of the new Public
Service  Agreement
8 for the latest Spending Review 2000
23  that promises to increase spending on
education and training by £10 billion by 2003-4.
One of the main rationales for the introduction of the system of Local Management of Schools
(LMS)  in 1990 was the devolution of educational budgets down to individual schools on the
presumption that local head-teachers and school governors were best placed to make the more
educationally effective use of their allocated resources .  Achieving educational  value for money
in  their use of resources is an important performance criterion both for LEAs in their required
pursuit  of  Best Value
24  and for individual schools within their OFSTED inspections
2. If there is
a  link between educational resourcing and educational performance, then an overall educational
performance management system should understand the nature of this link, in order to optimise
how  the total available resources are allocated to individual schools. This allocation may take
place via explicit  funding formulae ,  such as under those of LMS from LEAs to schools and the
Standard  Spending Assessment (SSA) system from central government to local authorities
19 ,  or
through a new  common national funding formula for all schools.
However,  Hanushek
25,  26   has persistently claimed that educational resources have no apparent
impact  on educational outcomes, arguing that “the research of the past quarter century into
educational  input-output relationships has indicated clearly that schools around the world pursue
very  inefficient policies”
26 .  Whether or not this claim is really true is of some importance both for
educational  performance measurement and for the appropriate response of the educational10
performance  management system. Hanushek’s claim is based upon a belief that his and other
empirical  studies of the  multivariate regression relationship between school examination
performance  and other variables, such as expenditure per pupil and socio-economic variables, is
estimating  an underlying ‘ educational production function’.  Frontier techniques, such as DEA
and  stochastic frontier analysis, would, however, distinguish between the performance of schools
on  the frontier from those inside an efficiency frontier, and therefore away from  the relevant
educational  production function that describes this frontier. The fact that there may be less
efficient  schools inside the frontier does not negate the existence of a positive relationship
between resources and educational outcomes, for a given vector of pupil intake  characteristics,
along the efficiency frontier and within its associated educational production function.
Linking multivariate regression relationship to simply the  supply-side concept of an educational
production  function can also be shown to neglect the importance of the  interaction between the
supply-side consideration of the additional  marginal cost of additional educational performance
a nd the associated  demand-side concept of the ‘ willingness to pay’  for such additional
examina tion performance
27,  28 .   Balancing these relationships through an  optimal allocation of
resources by an individual school will imply  that examination performance and expenditure per
pupil  are determined  endogenously at the point of intersection between the local demand curve
and  the marginal cost curve for examination performance for a given pupil group, as in Figure 2.
We would expect this marginal cost to be positive and upward sloping over some range,
reflecting  an underlying  law of diminishing returns  in which additional examination performance
becomes  progressively more costly to achieve for a given pupil intake. We would also expect this
marginal  cost curve to be higher for pupils from more disadvantaged backgrounds, as in the curve
MC’ compared  to MC in Figure 2,  reflecting the greater attention and educational resourcing
that they need to overcome this disadvantage. 
That  this marginal cost relationship (in which resources have a positive role in influencing
educational  outcomes) is consistent with an apparent lack of any observed cross-sectional
relationship  between resources and educational outcomes can be seen from Figure 2. Here we
a ssume a demand side willingness to pay for greater educational equality, such as under
educational resource allocation formulae that make offsetting adjustments to school  funding to11
compensate  for the  additional educational need 
19  of  a disadvantaged pupil intake. The fact that
the  demand curve, D’D’, is also higher when the marginal cost curve is higher for this
disadvantaged  group in Figure 2  leads here to an equal level of examination performance, despite
higher expenditure per pupil for the disadvantaged pupils.
Figure 2
The  demand-side inter-relationship that the resource allocation formulae may introduce between
expenditure  per pupil and the socio-economic variables that characterise educational advantage
may  imply a high degree of  multicollinearity between expenditure per pupil and these socio-
economic  variables. This in turn will weaken the precision and reliability of the parameter
estimates
29   of  the relative contributions of
  expenditure  per pupil and the socio-economic variables
in  contributing to educational performance.  No great reliance can then  be placed in earlier UK
single-equation  regression studies
30,  31  which found no significant relationship between many levels
of  examination performance and expenditure per pupil, but which used the same socio-economic
variables  within the multivariate regression equations as were used within the educational
resource allocation formulae to determine expenditure per pupil.  12
However,  even aside from problems of multicollinearity, the  endogenous nature of examination
performance  and expenditure per pupil under the above supply and demand interactions will bias
29
the  estimated regression coefficient of the impact of expenditure per pupil on examination results
that  is produced by standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation away from its true value
in  the underlying educational production function. These interactions will be further increased if
there is a tendency for more affluent parents to  migrate to the catchment areas of schools with
higher  published examination results and higher levels of resources per pupil. These interactions
will be further increased if local house prices are pushed up in the process, so that a  there  is a
pre-selection mechanism which tends to filter out more disadvantaged families from such schools.
There  will then tend to be a positive correlation  on the demand side between the socio-economic
backgroun d of pupils and examination results which will tend to bias upwards the estimated
regression  coefficient on socio-economic background  in the estimated ‘educational production
function’  under OLS away from its true value, and bias downwards that of expenditure per
pupil
32 .  The problem of  endogeneity bias is, moreover, not restricted to OLS regression analysis,
but  can also reduce  the reliability of frontier performance assessment techniques, such as DEA
33 .
The  simultaneous equations nature of the different inter-relationships which describe an
equilibrium level of educational performance, resourcing and socio-economic intake of each
school will also pose  identification problems
29   in seeking to correctly estimate  the parameters
of  the different equations involved. If an educational funding system does involve seeking to
compensate schools for those adverse factors which raise the costs of attaining a target level of
performance,  then the same variables will tend to affect both the  supply side and the willingness
to pay side of the relationship. It  may then be impossible to separately identify the quantitative
parameters  of the underlying supply-side educational production function,  as a performance
yardstick against which to judge the efficiency of individual schools.  
The reliability of existing performance measurement techniques
The  need and scope for assessing the reliability of existing performance measurement  techniques
in  education arises also in the context of two main assumptions of DEA. A central implicit
assumption  of the constant returns to scale model of DEA is that of  homotheticity of  the
estimated  production structure
34 . This means that multiplying the input-output vector of an13
efficient  school by a positive constant along a ray through the origin does not change the marginal
rates  of transformation (MRT) along the efficiency frontier between any pair of variables in the
inp ut-output vector. This is illustrated in Figure 3 where the MRT between any two inputs is
given by the slope of the efficient isoquants.  More generally, these MRT are given by the ratio
of the shadow variables in the linear program (LP) formulation
35  of DEA:
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where  y kj  , x hj ,  z i j  are the levels of output k, controllable input h and environmental input i
respectively of school j, s k,  v h and u i  are the corresponding shadow variables, and j = 0 is the
school  whose technical efficiency is being estimated .  The ratios of the values of s k,  v h and u i
which solve (1) remain the  same if we multiply all the  y kj  , x hj ,  z ij    by the same positive constant.
In  essence, the constant returns to scale model of  DEA implies a  single reference efficient
isoquant  from the given sample of schools whose shape remains the same for all levels of output,
subject  only to a radial expansion from the origin, as in Figure 3. Under the variable returns to
scale  version of DEA, the same remains true, except that the rays need not pass through the
origin but instead may involve a non-constant intercept with the axes
35 . 14
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When  we compare these implicit assumptions with the realities that may prevail in the education
sector,  it is quite possible that, as we expand both  esources per pupil and  the socio-economic
parameters  along a ray across the efficient isoquant map, their MRT may in fact change. A greater
increase in resources per pupil may be required to compensate for a given unit reduction in  the
socio-economic  input parameter when pupils are from very disadvantaged backgrounds than
when both these variables are at higher levels along the ray. Thus in Figure 4a, the slope of the
chord  between schools A and B is greater than that between C and D, where schools A, B, C and
D are all efficient schools and A = (8, 4, 10), B = ( 4, 10, 10) , C = ( 4,  3, 5) and D = (2, 4, 5),
where  the first element in the vector is expenditure per pupil, the second is the level of the socio-
economic variable, and the third is examination performance.
The dual
35  of  (1) is the LP :
min è 0 s. t.j
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where  the w 0 = [ w 0j  ]  is the vector of weights applied to the input-output vectors of each school
j > 0 in the sample to compute  the technical efficiency coefficient of school zero. By permitting
each  w 0j  to vary, DEA scales up or down the input-output vector of each school j until a convex
fron tier of the resultant points can be formed with which to compare the performance of any
selected  school 0. Scaling down points A and B in Figure 4a to points A’ and B’ to a comparable
level of output as those of points C and D produces a set of points whose convex frontier from
below  for the output level 5 will not include all of the points A’, B’, C and D’ once homotheticity
does  not hold in practice. Instead the convex frontier which DEA constructs in Figure 4b for the
output  level 5 is A’ D, causing school  C to be wrongly identified as having a positive slack in the
socio-economic variable in the input minimisation version of DEA in (1) and  (2), and to have a
technical  efficiency coefficient less than one in the corresponding output maximisation
35  problem .
                                       Figure 4a                                           Figure 4b                              
In  the above example, doubling the controllable variable of  expenditure per pupil from D to B,
or  from C to A, results in a doubling of examination performance, for some changes in the
uncontrollable variable. However, in the absence of   homotheticity between all the inputs, both16
con trollable and uncontrollable, full constant returns to scale with respect to proportionate
changes  in all the inputs do not prevail. Since the property of homotheticity depends upon which
transformations  of the variables are chosen, it is possible that selecting a different  transformation
of  the socio-economic variables may succeed in achieving homotheticity. However, the use of
DEA involves the problem that it does not generate an  independent check on which of the
schools  A, B, C and D are actually efficient that is independent of the assumed  homotheticity of
th e production structure. More generally, DEA can pose considerable difficulties in testing
whether  the underlying assumptions which DEA makes are fully appropriate, or alternatively are
misspecified,  for the particular application being studied. Some guide to the magnitude of the
underlying  problem will nevertheless be provided by the extent of  the variation which occurs in
the  different DEA efficiency scores for a given school under different  choices of transformation
of the socio-economic variables, or under other choices of the model specification. 
A further important implicit assumption of the standard formulation of  DEA is that the
production set, S, that defines the set of all technologically feasible input-output vectors (x,y),
is  convex. This assumption ensures that convex combinations of the input-output vectors of all
DMUs  in the comparison set are themselves feasible and can form the basis for computing the
technical efficiency of the DMU whose unit is being assessed. For the case of multiple outputs,
such  as typically occurs in the education sector, convexity of S in particular requires that the rate
of  product transformation, given by minus the slope of the production possibility frontier between
any two outputs, does not decrease as we move along the frontier. 
A case where this condition may not hold arises if  adequate care is not taken in the selection of
the outputs of each  educational institution. Thus one output of a school for its pupils at age 16
may  be the number of its (points weighted) GCSE passes. Another may be the staying-on rate for
its pupils, i.e. the number of its pupils who stay on for Sixth Form study. The production function
for the first output, y 1, that of its GCSE passes, may be of the form:
                  y 1 = g ( r 1  ,  á  )                                                                                                  (3)  
                         
being a function of   the resources, r 1  ,  that  are devoted to this output, together with the vector  á17
of  its pupil characteristics. The staying-on rate, y 2 , may depend not only on the resources, r 2 ,that
are   directly devoted to encouraging an increase in this second output and on the characteristics
of  the pupil intake,  á  , but also upon the level of the schools’ (points-weighted) GCSE passes,
so that the production function for the second output is of the form:
              y 2 = h ( r 2 ,  y 1,  á  )                                                                                                 (4)
The  rate of product transformation (RPT) between the two outputs, holding constant the total
school resource use r = r 1 + r 2  ,  is then given by:
      RPT 1, 2  = - (dy 2 / dy 1  )  r = const     = ( h 1 / g 1 ) - h 2     for h 2 =   Mh /  My 1                              (5)
and where g 1 > 0 and h 1 > 0 are the partial derivatives of g and h respectively with respect to their
resource input. Along the production possibility frontier, we then have:
   (d (RPT 1, 2  ) / dy 1  )  r = const  = - (d
2 y 2 / dy 1
2
  )  r = const                                                              (6)
                                       = - [ h 11  + (h 1 / g 1).g 11  + g 1
2 . h 22  - 2g 1.h 12 ] / g 1
2                           (7)
Under  the assumption of diminishing marginal physical productivity of resources devoted to the
two outputs, we have  g 11   /  M
2g  /  Mr 1
2 and  h 11   /  M
2h/   Mr 2
2 both negative in sign. However, the
signs  of h 2 , h 12   /  M
2h/   Mr 2  My 1 and h 22     /  M
2h/   My 1
2
  are  less clear-cut. A high level of GCSE passes
may  itself encourage more pupils to stay on into the Sixth Form in anticipation of being able to
build  further upon their academic success at GCSE. This itself will imply h 2   > 0 over this high
range  of GCSE passes. If this effect is more pronounced as GCSE passes rise further, we will
have  also h 22  > 0. An increased level of success at GCSE may also boost the marginal productivity
of  resources devoted to encouraging a higher staying-on rate, implying h 12  > 0 over this high
range of GCSE passes.
However, a low level of GCSE passes may also encourage more pupils to stay on into the Sixth
Form  than would occur at moderate levels of GCSE passes, if those pupils with disappointing18
passes at GCSE (for their given pupil intake characteristics  á  ) are seeking to retake  GCSEs in
the  Sixth Form in order to attempt to remedy their previous lack of success.   This itself will imply
h 2  < 0 over  this lower range of GCSE passes. Again, if this effect increases in absolute value as
y 1    falls  further, we will have h 22  > 0 over this range.  Falling GCSE passes may also boost the
marginal  productivity of resources devoted to encouraging a higher staying-on rate, implying h 12
< 0 over this low range of GCSE passes.
Such  values to h 22  and h 1 2 can clearly make the overall sign of (7) uncertain, given g 11  < 0 and
h 11    < 0, and if large enough can cause (7) to become negative in sign over some range. The basic
assumption  of DEA, of a convex production set, will then be broken. The estimates of technical
efficiency  that DEA produces will them be unreliable, and possibly substantially so. Thus in
Figure  5 below, the production possibility frontier is convex from above over the range of
interm ediate GCSE passes from C to F but becomes strictly concave from above between C and
B over the lower range of GCSE scores. If the observed sample of schools is A, B and C, the
t echnical efficiency coefficient which DEA produces for the school A based upon output
maximisation  will be OA/OE, where E is the point on the chord BC that lies on the ray OA
through the origin. However, now that the assumption of convexity of the production set no
longer holds, E is not in the feasible set, and A is actually on the efficiency frontier, and therefore
should have a technical efficiency coefficient of 1.0 rather than OA/OE. 19
Figure 5
For  schools in the high range of GCSE scores, the extent of the understatement of their true
technical efficiency coefficient which DEA produces may be  even greater. The rise in the value
of  h 2 as y 1 increases along the frontier  may become large enough to cause RPT to become
negative in (5). We then have an upward sloping section of the production possibility frontier in
Figure  5  for high values of y 1 , where the direct effect of  the increase in GCSE scores on
boosting  the staying-on rate in (4) is large enough now to overcome the indirect effect as
resources  are switched from y 2 to y 1  .  If the observed sample of schools is L, D and H, DEA
would  compute a technical efficiency coefficient of OD/OJ for school D, where J is on the chord
between L and H and  on the ray OD, even though D is perfectly efficient and on the efficiency
frontier.  If  the observed sample of schools is extended to include B and H’ in Figure 5, the extent
of  the understatement of D’s true technical efficiency is even greater, with DEA producing an
estimate of OD/ OJ’ compared to a true value of 1.0. 
A further difficulty which the application of DEA to education  illustrates is that which arises if20
the  effort, f ,  which each teacher exerts is an input variable which is not directly measured in the
DEA study. In the case of a single output, y, of education (such as points-weighted GCSE
scores), we may then have an underlying production function of the form:
              y = G ( N, K, f ( á  , N, K, y
T) ,  á  )                                                                         (8)
where  N denotes the number of teachers employed in the school, K denotes capital inputs,  á  the
characteristics of the pupil intake, and y
T is an output target that is set  for the school. How the
function f, which determines effort per teacher, behaves is then a critical element  of the overall
determination  of the school’s actual output y. For given values of  á  , N and K, we would expect
f to increase with y
T over some initial range, so  that over this range an increased target level of
performance encourages greater effort per teacher. This may be particularly the case if a system
of PRP is in place in which an actual output level that is equal to or greater than the target level
is rewarded by significant additional performance payments to teachers, and this target level of
output is achievable by reasonable levels of effort per teacher, given the values of N, K and  á
which the school faces.   
However,  as in Figure 6a, as the target level of performance, y
T,  is increased further, it may well
cause  a decline in effort per teacher, as the target level is viewed to be less and less attainable and
the  financial pay-off from PRP less and less worthwhile for the additional effort per teacher that
would  be required to achieve an actual level of y at least as great as the target level, y
T.  An
optimal  level of the output target, y
T,  (if we ignore any additional financial costs which any
associated  system of  PRP may itself impose) will be attained when f is at a maximum with
respect to  y’, for given values of  á  , N and K in (8). When we substitute the optimal level y
T* =
y
T* ( á  , N, K) in (8), we obtain:
             y = Q ( N, K,  á  ) = G (N, K, f ( á  , N, K, y
T* ( á  , N, K),  á  )                                       (9)
For  a given value of the target level of performance, y
T, the effort, f,  per teacher in (8)  will also
vary  with the number of teachers, N, in the school.  With a high value to N, the given output
target,  y
T,  may be attained with relatively little effort per teacher. As N is reduced from its initial21
high  level, more effort per teacher is required, and may be forthcoming,  as in Figure 6b,  to attain
the given target level of  output,  y
T.  However, as N is further reduced, the given target level of
output,  and its contingent rewards from PRP, become less and less attainable, causing motivation
to  decline. Further reductions in the number of teachers, N, and consequent increases in class
sizes,  may cause further teacher demotivation, stress,  absenteeism and increasing sickness rates
due to stress.   
                              Figure 6a                                                            Figure 6b
Given that setting the output target optimally implies that  Mf /  My
T = 0, the second derivative  of
Q in (9) with respect to N is given by:
             Q NN = G NN   + G f f  . f N
2 + G  f  . f  NN  + 2. G N f  . f N     - 2.G  f  . ((f  N T )  
2
  / f TT)                    (10)
where the subscript T denotes a derivative with respect to  y
T .Convexity from the origin of the
isoquants between N and K in the production of the educational  output y    in (9)  can be shown
to require that Q NN   is non-positive
36 .  We may expect diminishing marginal physical productivity
of N and f directly in q, and hence G NN and G f f   both  to be negative in (10). From Figure 6b we
have here also f  NN  < 0, with G f  > 0 in (9). However, we would  expect that additional effort per
teacher  will raise the marginal physical productivity of additional numbers of teachers, implying
GNf  > 0. As in Figure 6a,  f N     may be positive over an initial range. If raising the output target,
y
T,  has a diminishing impact on effort per teacher, then the last term of (10) will also be positive.
Even if this last term is omitted because the output target y
T is held constant, rather than22
optimally varied as N is varied, (10) is overall  of uncertain sign, for low values of N when f N is
positive.  Convexity from the origin of the isoquants between the measured outputs N and K,
holding   á  constant, is then not guaranteed, contrary to the assumptions of the standard model of
DEA.  The result of applying DEA as a performance measurement technique is this context may
then  again be an under-estimation by DEA of the actual coefficients of technical efficiency of
schools in the sample that is under examination by reference to the inputs N, K and  á  . 
Mis-estimating the value of the coefficient of technical efficiency may then lead to a  number of
prob lems in the context of performance management. The first is an over-estimate of the potential
increases  in educational outputs which the educational system as a whole can expect to achieve,
from  an examination of  what the current performance of  schools shows to be possible. The
second  is the setting of output targets for individual schools, as under the current  target-setting
proces s within LEA Education Development Plans
5,  at an excessively high level. As in Figure 6a,
this  may adversely impact on teacher effort and the actual level of school performance achieved.
The  third problem is a potential disillusionment with performance reward systems, such as PRP,
if  some schools are set unattainable targets on the basis of under-estimates of their existing
technical efficiency
6.    
Knowledge, performance and resource management
The above discussion highlights the need for greater attention to be paid to the performance,
reliability  and potential pitfalls of performance measurement techniques themselves, and for
sufficient  care to be exercised in how they are deployed within performance management systems.
The complex interactions between supply and demand  considerations, and between labour and
other  inputs,and with characteristics of the pupil intake in producing multiple outputs, which are
involved  in the education system, mean that whilst a technique such as DEA has potentially much
to  offer in this context, a number of technical problems remain before full reliance can be placed
upon its findings. 
As  with education itself, a key attribute of  knowledge management in this context should be that23
of  learning about the  nature  of the underlying problems and their practical significance. Rather
than  knowledge being a fixed entity which is then uncritically applied  to real world systems, such
as  those of performance management, the process must be more  interactive.  Knowledge itself
needs to be enhanced by the stimulation and questioning which the complexities of real world
environments, such as education, can produce. 
A further role for performance indicators  in this context is then as a  trigger for further
investigation
1.  Rather than seeking to provide final  answers to assessments of performance,
performance  measurement techniques in education and elsewhere can be deployed as part of a
quality control process that utilises these techniques to trigger more detailed investigations into
the  complexities of an organisation’s performance. Their use in such a process can  explicitly
recognise  the risk, and relative costs, both of  Type 1 errors,  of investigating when the
organisation  is under sound existing management and its performance not capable of substantial
improvement,  and of   Type 2 errors
37 ,  of failing to investigate when the organisation and its
management are capable of significant improvements .  An existing process in primary and
secondary  education that has many potential attributes of a quality control system is that of
OFSTED  school inspection visits
2.  These involve substantial costs, not only from the direct cost
of  the inspectors’ time, but also in terms of  the  compliance costs that are imposed upon the
schools  themselves in preparing for these visits .  There is therefore a need  to ensure that the
expected  benefits which these inspections achieve exceed the costs which they generate. The
associated  net benefit  may be increased by deploying appropriate performance measurement
techniques  to better  target inspection visits on schools where there is likely to be scope for
significant improvement in performance from intervention.
The attainment of long-run improvements in performance is itself likely to involve a  continuing
process of advice, such as from local LEA advisors, rather than reliance simply upon infrequent
‘big  bang’ OFSTED inspections. Such  qualitative interaction 
20 ,  in conjunction with quantitative
ass essments from performance measurement techniques ,  may assist in enhancing our
understanding  of the strengths and limitations of these quantitative techniques. As a result of this
feedback, these techniques may themselves be further improved .  However, if knowledge itself
becomes  simply a  product for sale by consultants in pre-packaged form in ways which cannot be24
rea dily questioned or challenged, there is a risk of false conclusions being drawn from over-
confidence  in its capabilities, and a lack of awareness of the limitations of existing performance
measurement techniques.
A further important attribute of knowledge management should be the cost-effective deployment
of  data to enhance our understanding of the scope for improved performance, and for improved
performance  measurement techniques. As the author has argued in a recent report to the DfEE
19 ,
there  is considerable scope for a   national comparative database to be established to the benefit
of  researchers, LEA advisers, school managers, OFSTED, the Audit Commission and central
government.  Such a database would  include disaggregated data on school expenditure and
resource  use patterns,  characteristics of the pupil intake, and value added outcome measures.
Much  of such data could be produced as low-cost by-products of well-designed routine
management  systems, such as computerised school time-tabling systems. Such  data might shed
considerable  light on the pattern of deployment of teachers and other resources  across different
age  groups and subject areas within the school, and on their resultant impact on school
performance.
Knowledge  of this kind is critical for improved resource management, both within the school, and
in  determining the details of optimal funding formulae for schools which can direct resources to
where  they are likely to be most educationally effective. In the current absence of such
knowle dge, there is no strong available research evidence to support the choice of key policy
parameters  in existing funding formulae. These include the differential age weights which are used
in  the computation of each school’s age-weighted pupil numbers. These in turn  make up at least
80  per cent of local school funding from its LEA and determine most of the relative funding
balance  between primary and secondary schools
19 .   A suitable database would also assist in
evaluating the effectiveness of policy innovations, such as the introduction of additional 20,000
classroom  assistants and the increased use of educational technology in schools. Without carefully
monit oring the effectiveness of these innovations, important knowledge will be unnecessarily lost,
to the potential detriment of all participants in the education system. 
The scope for making everyone better off, through Pareto improvements, is at the heart of the25
theoretical  basis of  DEA
35 .   However, many existing applied DEA studies in education
3,  20, 38  and
elsewhere  have concentrated on computing each organisation’s coefficient of   technical
efficiency,  which focusses on the scope for performance improvements or cost reductions, whilst
holding  constant the existing proportionate input mix of the organisation.  In the context of
education,  it can be argued that performance improvements are less likely to come from
maintaining  constant the existing proportionate mix between inputs. Instead, educational
improvements  may come through significantly changing the input mix, with much greater support
for  teachers from classroom assistants and new technology, in the form of IT, video systems and
other  capital investment to support learning. Such changes may become increasingly desirable as
the  relative price of able graduates tends to rise over time, and that of computer and other capital
equipment  tends to fall. New technology in service industries, as well as in manufacturing, is also
likely  to result in a growing pool of semi-skilled workers facing redundancy or forced early
retirement, from whom many gifted classroom assistants might be recruited.  
Given  substantial recruitment problems
39  for teachers, particularly in areas such as mathematics
a nd modern languages, improving teachers’ marginal productivity and reducing the stress of
teachers through greater supporting resources  may not only directly improve school
performance.  They may also make possible improved pay and working conditions that enhance
teacher  recruitment, particularly of more able teachers, and thereby have further indirect positive
influences  on educational performance. Issues of price and allocative efficiency, which Farrell
tended   to downplay in his original seminal article
40   on  the measurement of productive efficiency,
become  then of central importance to performance management in education.  The need for care
in  the application of DEA is again underlined by the potential for the basic assumption of
convexity  (here of the set of capital and labour inputs capable of producing any given level of
educational  output) to be undermined by a strong degree of  complementarity between capital and
labour  inputs
36 ,  in which the marginal productivity of teachers is significantly raised by additional
supporting resources, and vice versa .  26
Conclusion    
Education  provides an important area for the application of both performance measurement
techniques and systems of performance management. It is also an area where great care must be
taken  at the interface between the two if dysfunctional outcomes are not to result. Performance
measurement  techniques, such as DEA and multivariate regression analysis, need themselves to
be  subject to a continuing  performance audit  to assess how far the potential complexities of the
real  world, which they may encounter in areas such as education, are adequately  allowed for in
their  own assessment of performance. Such complexities, including those related to the
interaction  between educational performance, pupil and teacher motivation, stress, and
recruitment,  need also to be adequately addressed by performance management systems and their
constituent  parts, such as performance related pay. In addition, education illustrates the
importance  of an adequate linkage between  performance management systems  and issues of
strate gic management.  Rather than concentrating mainly on issues of technical efficiency,
performance management systems  in education need also to address important strategic issues
of  price and allocative efficiency regarding the relative importance of different outputs of the
educational  system, and the scope for productively changing the input mix to provide greater
support for individual teachers in the process of securing enhanced educational performance.
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